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THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF STANDING UNDER
SECTION 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Paul C. Cumin "87*
Christine M. Ford'
INTRODUCTION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19951 was
intended to raise a plaintiff's burden of pleading scienter under
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (the "1934 Act")
and Rule 10b-53 promulgated thereunder. Perhaps as a result,
practitioners have observed an increase in the filing of suits under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"),4 which
ordinarily does not require a plaintiff to plead scienter or reliance,
or to comply with the heightened pleadings standards applicable
to claims of fraud.5 The difficulties experienced by a number of
high profile initial public offerings ("IPOs") may be expected to
"Paul C. Cumin is a member of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
Christine M. Ford is an associate with Simpson Thacher & Bartlett
1. PL 104-67,109 Stat 737,1995 HR 1053 (Dec. 22,1995).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
5. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 604 n.8 (1997) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that litigation under the 1933 Act increased after the
Supreme Court held that scienter was an element of a cause of action under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder). If a Section 11 claim does sound in fraud, however,
the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
applies. Castlerock Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ultralife Batteries, Inc., 6S F. Supp. 2d 480,
485 (D.N.J. 1999); see also Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. Civ. 96-1514,1993 WL
1018624, at -21 D. Ariz. Feb. 5,1993) ("Rule 9(b) applies to § 11 claims that are
based in fraud.").
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continue or increase this trend, making the issue of standing
under Section 11 a particularly appropriate point to address.
There are two schools of thought as to who has standing to
file suit under Section 11. The first one requires that a plaintiff
must have purchased shares in the actual offering itself. The
second is that a plaintiff has standing even if his or her shares are
purchased in the secondary market within a certain number of
days after the offering, or are otherwise "traceable" to the
offering.
This article examines the origins of the so-called "tracing"
doctrine, the development of Section 11 jurisprudence, and the
reasons why Section 11 should be construed to confer standing
only upon purchasers who acquired securities directly in a public
offering.
I. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 11
Section 11 of the 1933 Act affords a remedy to civil litigants
for materially false or misleading statements or omissions in a
registration statement.6 Enacted to ensure compliance with the
disclosure provisions of the 1933 Act, Section 11 specifies the class
of defendants subject to suit under its provisions, imposing
liability only on persons with a direct connection to a registered
offering.7 The class of defendants subject to liability under
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). The statute provides:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to
state a material fact required to be stated therein not misleading, any
person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of
such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law
or in equity, sue ....
Id. Section 11 applies to newly issued shares under a registration statement.
See id. As such, both initial and secondary offerings fall within its scope.
Murphy v. Hollywood Entre't, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22207, at *11 n.4 (D. Or.
May 9,1996).
7. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1983) ("The
section was designed to assure compliance with the disclosure provisions of the
Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who play a
direct role in a registered offering."); see Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A.
Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
Section 11 includes: (1) every person who signed the registration
statement, (2) all directors or partners of the issuer at the time the
registration statement was filed; (3) all persons who, with their
consent, are named in the registration statement as about to
become a director or partner of the issuer; (4) experts who
prepared or certified portions of the registration statement; and
(5) the underwriters of the securities offering.8 For an issuer,
liability under Section 11 can be "virtually absolute;"9 even an
innocent misstatement or omission subjects an issuer to liability.10
For other defendants, however, a due diligence defense is
available."1
The statute provides for damages in an amount representing
the difference between the purchase price of the security and its
value at the time the lawsuit was commenced, the price at which
plaintiff previously sold the security, or the price at which the
security was sold after suit but before judgment'? In no event
shall the damages exceed the offering price.13
At one time, courts routinely extended standing under
Section 11 to aftermarket purchasers who alleged that their shares
were "traceable" to a registration statement.14 A majority of these
courts, however, never explained what "tracing" meant, how it
should be pled, or the factors necessary to trace one's share(s) to a
particular registration statement 15 The few courts that addressed
"tracing" as a substantive standard generally held that a plaintiff
must have purchased a security directly in an offering to maintain
suit under Section 11. However, the predominant effect of
"tracing" was that any open market purchaser could bring suit
under Section 11, greatly expanding the class of plaintiffs to
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 345 (1933)
("Section 11 acts as an 'in terrorem' remedy to deter violations by encouraging
careful preparations.").
8. 15 U.S.C § 771(a)(1)-(5).
9. Huddkeston, 459 U.S. at 382.
10. Id.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 771,(b).
12. Id. at § 77k(e).
13. Id. at § 77k(g).
14. See cases discussed infra Part V.B.
15. Id.
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whom Section 11 provided a remedy.16 Thus, the expansive
concept of "traceability" nullified the principle requiring Section
11 plaintiffs to show a demonstrable nexus between the offering
and their purchase of a particular security. The failure to ascribe
a rigorous definition to "tracing" also violated the basic tenet that
a statutory remedy is available only to plaintiffs who fall within
the zone of interests protected by the statute in question.17
Although the question of standing may be raised at any time,
it is particularly appropriate to raise the issue in the early stages
of litigation. In securities litigation, where most suits are filed as
class actions, 8 it is important to resolve questions of standing
early because they bear upon the typicality of class
representatives and affect evaluation of damages and settlement
considerations. 9 Indeed, a leading authority on class action
lawsuits has recognized that the question of standing is a
threshold issue on a class certification motion.20 While some
16. See LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, 3d § 11-C-
2(d)(i) (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1999) ("Suit may be brought by any person who
acquired a registered security, whether in the process of distribution or in the
open market.").
17. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (discussing "self-imposed
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction," including the requirement "that a
plaintiffs grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or
regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the
suit"); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998).
18. See Securities Fraud Litigation Sets Record in 1998 Gan. 27, 1999), at
http://securities.stanford.edu/news/990125/pressrel.htm. ("[A]t least 235
companies were named as defendants in federal class action securities fraud
lawsuits in 1998... [which] indicates a litigation rate of close to 'one-a-day' for
every trading day that the stock market is open.").
19. See In re Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV. 92-3970, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19806, at* 10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993).
20. HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.07
n.49 (3d ed. 1992) ("The proper procedure for determining certifiability of a
class is for the court to determine initially whether the named plaintiffs have
standing to assert individual claims.... "). Indeed, "the question of standing is
a threshold inquiry in all actions." City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co.,
147 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 1998); see also David v. Simware, Inc., No. 602143-96,
slip op. at 8-9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 7, 1997) (noting that questions of standing
under Sections 11 and 12 are appropriately addressed on a motion for class
certification), available at
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
courts have noted that "traceability" (and therefore standing) is a
merits issue that must await trial on the Section 11 claim,;' it may
defeat the utility of the class action vehicle to conduct a "mini-
trial" on each plaintiff's standing, and therefore, it is generally
more sensible to resolve issues of standing early.
11. THE GENESIS OF "TRACING" AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION
11 JURISPRUDENCE
A. Barntes v. Oso fsln
The concept of "tracing" originated in Barnes v. Osofslk, 2 a
decision that restricted the potential class of plaintiffs under
Section 11. Barnes involved a public offering of newly issued
shares that supplemented a preexisting market for registered
shares of the defendant's stock. The Barites plaintiffs sought
approval of a settlement on behalf of all shareholders, regardless
of whether their shares were newly issued or previously acquired
on the open market 24 The district court concluded that the
settlement class must be limited because "Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and its interpretation in this Circuit,
preclude participation, by shareholders whose shares were not
part of the public issue complained of, in a settlement of an action
maintained under that section."25 In so holding, the district court
explained that any technical objections to the administration of its
ruling were unfounded because the defendants were capable of
identifying the shares issued in the public offering.26
http://securities.stanford.edu/research/articles/19970723sen2.htmL
21. See, e.g., In re Lilco Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663 (E.D.N.Y. 196).
22. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
23. Id.
24. Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 373 F.2d
269 (2d dir. 1967).
25. Id. at 726 (citing Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 183 F.2d 7S3 (2d Cir.
1951)).
26. Id. The district court's explanation necessarily implies that only initial
purchasers would have standing because the defendants are not capable of
identifying the shares once they are subject to over-the-counter trading. See
2001]
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Accordingly, the district court approved a settlement class
consisting of "the shareholders who.., acquired any part of the
200,000 shares of the public offering which is the subject of these
lawsuits. All other shareholders are excluded."27 In limiting the
settlement class, the court noted that "while holders of other
shares may possibly have some legal remedy, it is not to be found
in an action under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, and
their rights will not be affected by the bar order."28 Accordingly,
only a purchaser who obtained shares in an offering could trace
his or her securities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
framed the issue as: "whether the district court was correct in
ruling that § 11 extends only to purchases of the newly registered
shares," and affirmed the district court.29 The Barnes plaintiffs
argued against the concept of "tracing," contending that "tracing"
was impractical and that Section 11 should be read to apply
broadly to all shareholders.30 The Second Circuit rejected this
argument reasoning that "[sjince... only individual shares are
registered, it seems unlikely that the section developed to insure
proper disclosure in the registration statement was meant to
provide a remedy for other than the particular shares
registered."3' Thus, the Barnes court's concept of "tracing"
required a plaintiff to demonstrate that shares were acquired in
an offering. The court observed that "[a]ppellants' broader
Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870,874 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
27. Barnes, 254 F. Supp. at 725.
28. Id. at 726.
29. Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271.
30. Id. at 272. The Barnes plaintiffs offered three arguments against
constricting Section 11 standing through the concept of "tracing": (1) it is
unreasonable to distinguish old shares from new shares because an unduly
optimistic offering document would affect shares in the marketplace; (2) "to
read that section as applying only to purchasers who can trace the lineage of
their shares to the new offering makes the result turn on mere accident since
most trading is done through brokers who neither know nor care whether they
are getting newly registered or old shares;" and (3) "it is often impossible to
determine whether previously traded shares are old or new, and that tracing is
further complicated when stock is held in margin accounts in street names." Id.
at 271-72.
31. Id. at 272.
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
reading would be inconsistent with the over-all statutory
scheme,"32 referring to the 1933 and 1934 Acts as a whole. The
Second Circuit concluded that narrowing the class of plaintiffs
under Section 11 was consistent with the "traditional limited
reading" of that statute.33
The Barnes court noted that its narrow interpretation of
Section 11 was fully consistent with judicial precedent and the
narrow construction of Section 11 employed by leading jurists in
the field.A For example, in Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing
Co., 3 the Second Circuit stated: "A suit under Sec. 11 of the 1933
Act requires no proof of fraud or deceit, and such a suit may be
maintained only by one who comes within a narrow class of
persons i.e., those who purchase securities that are the direct
subject of the prospectus and registration statement...
B. Imnplenentation of "Tracin. .
Immediately following Barnes, courts held that only those
who purchase shares that are the "direct subject" of the
registration statement may maintain a cause of action under
Section 11. "Direct subject" was interpreted to mean initial
purchasers. For example, in Wolfton v. Solomon 37 the court cited
Barnes in certifying a Section 11 class consisting of plaintiffs who
32. Id.
33. Id. at 273.
34. See id. (citing Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 18S F.2d 733 (2d Cir.
1951)); see also Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswidck Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (concluding in favor of the traditional limited reading of § 11).
35. 183 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
36. Id. at 786. Judge Frank, "a leading member of the SEC in its early days,"
authored the Fiscmuan opinion. Barnes, 373 F.2d at 273. The Barnes court
accorded Judge Frank's view considerable deference. Id. Other authority cited
in Barnes recognized that the 1933 Act applies "only on the occasion of a public
offering." Milton I-L Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HAV. L. R-v.
1340, 1341 (1966). Cohen advocates the abolition of the 1933 Act due to its
limited applicability "on the special occasion of a public offering." Id. at 1340.
As an alternative, the author proposes an expansion of the 1934 Act to
incorporate the 1933 Act's disclosure provisions. Id. at 1342.
37. 54 F.R.D. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
20011
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purchased their shares directly from the underwriters A The
Wolfson court also certified a separate class of aftermarket
purchasers to pursue causes of action under Section 17(a) of the
1933 Ac 9 and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act-the remedy for
aftermarket purchasers.40 The same result was reached in Langert
v. Q-1 Corporation,41 where the court held that "[t]hose who
purchased stock directly from the underwriter on the basis of the
registration statement and prospectus possess a right of action
under Sections 11 and 12.... "42 Accordingly, the Langert court
also certified one class of initial purchasers and a second class of
aftermarket purchasers with claims arising under Section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.43
Although early application of "tracing" limited standing to
initial purchasers, as courts confronted arguments regarding the
meaning of "tracing," four new theories evolved.44
* Direct Trace. Under the "direct trace" method, standing is
conferred only when the stock at issue "is directly
purchased in the underwritten public offering."45 Indicia
38. Id. at 588; see also id. at 591 (noting distinctions between the Section 11
class comprised of purchasers who acquired securities directly in a public
offering and the class consisting of persons who acquired shares in over the
counter transactions).
39. Only one provision of the 1933 Act, Section 17(a), extends beyond
public offerings. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,576 (1995).
40. Wolfson, 54 F.R.D. at 588 ("If the instant action is to be a class action,
then it must embrace two classes, for there will be persons who purchased on
the open market and cannot avail themselves of the remedies of the Section 11
class.").
41. [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,445, 1974 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9514 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15,1974).
42. Id. at *14.
43. Id.; see also Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279,287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating
that shares purchased in the open market cannot be traced and that aftermarket
purchasers could therefore not invoke Section 11).
44. See Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984), affd, 760 F.2d
272 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing the direct, fungible mass, contrabroker, and
heritage methods of "tracing"). Kirkwood is the seminal case describing the
"tracing" methods.
45. Id. at 1378; see also Bruce G. Vanyo and Terry T. Johnson, Restrictions on
the Scope of the Civil Liability Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 313 PLI/Lit
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
documenting the "trace" would include:
an indication of interest by the broker on behalf of the
customer, the customer's receipt of a preliminary
prospectus with a legend in red ink (called a 'red
herring'), a notation on the purchase order ticket showing
purchase in the offering, purchase at the offering price,
lack of commission, language regarding the prospectus on
the customer's confirmation slip, and special coding of the
transaction by the brokerage firm.4b
o Fungible Mass. The "fungible mass" theory requires a court
to determine that a proportionate number of shares on the
market are "new" shares issued pursuant to a registration
statement Under the "fungible mass" theory, the court
may then impute that a corresponding number of shares
held by plaintiffs are "traceable to the offering."47
o Contrabroler. Under the "contrabroker" method, shares
would be traceable when a plaintiff purchases shares from
his or her own broker, who had previously purchased the
securities from a market maker.43
o Heritage. The "heritage" method of tracing requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate that the certificate numbers of his
or her shares corresponded to shares issued in an
offering.49
Having examined each method, the I(irlaood court concluded
that the "direct trace" method was the proper means of "tracing"
a purchase to an offering.50 The court noted that among the
advantages of this method is that it is easy to understand and
prove because the indicia establishing the trace is easily
255,271 (Sept. 1,1986) (arguing that "if direct tracing were not required, anyone
who purchased any shares at any time subsequent to a public offering could
sue under Section 11 ... [and that] such a result would be inconsistent with the
overall statutory scheme of the 1933 Act.. .") (citation omitted).
46. Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1373.
47. Id. at 1379.
48. Id. at 1381.
49. Id. at 1382.
50. Id. at 1378.
2001]
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established and generally uncontroverted1 Moreover, it found
the "direct trace" method to be consistent with the legislative
inten 52 and the traditional limited construction of Section 11.53
The Kirkwood court also noted that the other methods
"violateD common sense."54 The "fungible mass" theory reduces
the question of standing to a mathematical formula that, in its
final analysis, requires a court to presume that plaintiffs have
standing.-5 Similarly, the "contrabroker" and "heritage" methods
51. Id.
52. See infra notes 55 to 56 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
intent).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 24 (discussing the traditional
narrow interpretation of Section 11).
54. Kirkwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1381.
55. Id. at 1380. Notwithstanding the judicial rejection of the "fungible
mass" theory, one commentator has attempted recently to resurrect it. See
Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933
Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429 (Apr. 2000). Professor Sale contends that
the "tracing" requirement is under-inclusive and that Section 11 should provide
a cause of action to aftermarket purchasers. See id. at 464. Thus, Professor Sale
proposes that the statistical method - rejected by the Kirkwood and Elscint courts
- be employed to confer standing on aftermarket purchasers. Id. at 485. To
support this thesis, Professor Sale analogizes securities fraud to toxic torts
positing that the statistical evidence method employed to establish causation in
the Agent Orange products liability litigation should apply to Sections 11 and
12. Id. at 484-88. Not only is this policy-driven approach inconsistent with the
judicial precedent and legislative history of the 1933 Act, it also fails to
acknowledge that there may be a difference between toxic tort plaintiffs and
securities fraud litigants. Not the least of these differences is that the
aftermarket purchaser has an explicit statutory remedy: Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. See infra notes 176 to 184 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory scheme. Conversely,
without resorting to statistical evidence, the toxic tort plaintiff is without a
remedy. Professor Sale's analogy is also flawed because courts have inherent
flexibility in establishing the parameters of common law tort claims. Statutory
rights of action - such as Sections 11 and 12 - must be construed in accordance
with the statutory language and legislative intent. See Pinter v. DahI, 486 U.S.
622, 652 (1988) ("The broad remedial goals of the Securities Act are insufficient
justification for interpreting a specific provision 'more broadly than its
language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit"') (quoting Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)). Extending standing to
aftermarket purchasers based upon statistical probabilities would contravene
the Supreme Court's mandate.
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
confer standing upon plaintiffs based upon speculation and
conjecture. The Kirkwood court explained that the "contrabroker"
method is flawed because "anyone who ever purchased from a
participant in the underwriting after the offering date could claim
he or she bought 'new' shares."Es This result would undermine
the limited scope of Section 11. Similarly, the "heritage" method
does not account for market realities because, due to conversions
and surrenders, plaintiffs can only demonstrate that they "might
have purchased" offering stock.57
Perhaps due to these problems, it appears that no court has
adopted the "fungible mass," "contrabroker," or "heritage"
methods of "tracing." As courts have recognized, the common
flaw in all three methods is that the question of standing is
reduced to speculation.s Conjecture cannot form the predicate
for standing because "[Section] 11... requir[es] more than a
showing that a plaintiff's stock 'might' have come from the
relevant offering."59
Thus, a body of caselaw developed holding that only
purchasers who could trace their shares via the "direct trace"
method-i.e., purchased through an underwriter in an offering-
have standing under Section 11.0 To establish the traceability of
56. Kiravood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378.
57. Id.
58. See e.g., In re Quarterdedc Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV. 92-3970,
1993 U.S. DisL LEXIS 19806, at -8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993) (recognizing that
courts have rejected a showing of "more probable than not' as sufficient to
establish standing).
59. Id. (quoting Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870, 874
(N.D. Cal. 1986)).
60. See id.; see also Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(finding that shares purchased in the open marl;et cannot be traced and that
therefore, aftermarket purchasers could not invoke Section 11); Franklin Life
Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 607 n.1 (S.D. Il 1978)
("Section 11... has been interpreted generally as being limited to damages for
purchasers at the original offering, thus excluding those members of the
plaintiff class who purchased in a secondary markeL"), ff'd, 59S F.2d 1109 (7th
Cir. 1979); Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc., Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) T 92,207
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1935) (dLsmissing Section 11 claims for failure to allege that
shares were purchased in the offering); Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634
F. Supp. 870, 874 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (dismissing Section 11 claim for a failure to
20011
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shares, courts suggested pleading facts such as "who purchased
what, when the purchases occurred, and from whom."61 From
these basic facts (in addition to the purchase price), courts would
be able to adjudicate the standing question under a substantive
legal standard at an early stage of the litigation. The issue may
also be determined by reference to the underwriters' records
which show who purchased shares in the offering.62 Courts
employing this analysis reached the conclusion that plaintiffs
who purchased in the secondary market do not have standing
under Section 11.63
However, while the reasoning of the "direct trace" cases is
consistent with the limited view of Section 11 standing, the
concept of "tracing" soon became separated from the restrictions
of the "direct trace" theory. Subsequently, courts rejected the
demonstrate that shares could be directly traced to an initial public offering);
Rice v. Windsor Indus., No. 85 C 4196, 1986 WL 2728, at *7 (N.D. 111. Feb. 27,
1986) (dismissing Section 11 claim for failure to allege that the securities were
the "direct subject" of the offering or facts sufficient to warrant an inference
that the shares could be "traced" to the registration statement); In re Elscint,
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 380 (D. Mass. 1987) ("tracing" requires proof
by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff "be a purchaser of a
determinate number of new shares at a determinate price"); Guenther v.
Cooper Life Scis, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1437,1439 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that "[a]
cause of action under section 11 is available only to purchasers of 'stock
actually issued in the offering for which the plaintiff claims there was a false or
misleading registration statement," and dismissing plaintiffs' claims for failure
to show that the shares were the direct subject of the offering) (quoting Abbey,
634 F. Supp. at 872)); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 275,
279 (D.D.C. 1991) (indicating that plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to "trace"
their shares because they purchased on the date of the offering).
61. Rice, 1986 WL 2728, at *7 (dismissing Section 11 claim for failure to
allege that the securities were the "direct subject" of the offering or facts
sufficient to warrant an inference that the shares could be "traced" to the
registration statement).
62. In re Lilco Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 671 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
63. See Franklin Life, 451 F. Supp. at 607 n.1 ("Section 11 ... has been
interpreted generally as being limited to damages for purchasers at the original
offering, thus excluding those members of the plaintiff class who purchased in
a secondary market."), affid, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1979); Lorber, 407 F. Supp. at
287 (finding that shares purchased in the open market cannot be traced and that
therefore, aftermarket purchasers could not invoke Section 11).
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reasoning and limitations of the "direct trace" cases, and simply
accepted conclusory allegations that shares could be traced
without any explanation of what "tracing" meant.64 These
decisions neither probe the practicality of "tracing," nor do they
consider the 1933 Act's fundamental purpose of regulating the
distribution of newly issued securities. Rather, these courts
accepted mere allegations of "tracing" and consequently
expanded the scope of the 1933 Act to aftermarket trading.63 This
line of authority resulted in a departure from the legislative intent
and the structure of the statutory scheme.0S
m. DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 12 JURISPRUDENCE
It is difficult to address Section 11 without an examination of
the jurisprudence developed under its companion statute, Section
12. The two sections share the same legislative history, and
canons of statutory construction mandate that provisions of a
64. See In re AES Corp. Sec. Litig., 825 F. Supp. 578, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(finding a general allegation of "traceability" sufficient to state a claim under
Section 11); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 850, 854-55 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding sufficient an allegation that plaintiffs "purchased or otherwise
acquired Crazy Eddie securities issued pursuant to and traceable to those
defective Registration Statements"); Gibb v. Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59,70
(N.D. Tex. 1984) ("[A] party need only show that he purchased securities that
are the direct subject of the prospectus and registration statement.").
65. See, e.g., In re Ramtek Sec. Litig., No. C 88-20195,1991 WL 56067, at *10
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 4,1991) (adopting a broad interpretation of "tracing" to expand
Section 11). In Ram tek, the court held that "a Section 11 claim can be brought by
any person regardless of whether they [sic] had purchased a registered security
in the original offering or months later in the open market.... All a debenture
subclass member needs to do to assert standing to pursue a Section 11 claim is
demonstrate his debentures are 'traceable' to the debentures issued on the
initial public offer." Id. (citing Barnes v. OsofsIw, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967)).
Ramtek's expansive use of the "tracing" concept to broaden a plaintiff class
illustrates the problems engendered by the failure to attribute a substantive
meaning to "tracing."
66. See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994) ("The 1933 Act regulates initial distributions of
securities, and the 1934 Act for the most part regulates post-distribution
trading.").
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statute be read as a whole.67 Indeed, the caselaw construing
Section 12 largely has been influenced by a recognition of Section
11's exclusive application to initial distributions.68
Recognizing the limited reach of the 1933 Act, courts have
construed Section 12 to apply solely to initial distributions of
securities.69 In a case of first impression among federal appellate
courts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, held that Section 12
"provides a remedy to buyers of securities only in the initial
distributions."70 In so holding, the Ballay court stated: "We
67. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,570,572 (1995).
68. See, e.g., First Union Disc. Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835,
843 (11th Cir. 1993). In holding that Section 12 does not provide aftermarket
purchasers with a right of action, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit explained:
[Slection 12 is structurally positioned after sections 11 and 12(1), which
respectively govern the registration of securities and create civil liability for
sales of unregistered securities, and before section 13, which establishes a
limitations period for sections 11 and 12. Because section 12(2) is sandwiched
between sections that deal exclusively with initial distributions, it too must be
so limited.
Id. (citing Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991));
see also Elliott J. Weiss, The Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section 12(2)
Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48 BUs. LAW. 1, 12 (1992) ("Analysis of sections
11 and 12 establishes that viewed functionally -as a remedy directed solely at
public offerings-section 12(2) nonetheless has a critical part in the statutory
scheme.").
69. SSH Co., Ltd. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1059
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that aftermarket purchasers' Section 12 claims must be
dismissed because "[t]he purpose of the '33 Act was the regulation of the
distribution of securities"); Grinsell v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 744 F. Supp. 931,
934 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 1990) (concluding that Section 12 applies only to initial
distributions and explaining that "[ijn light of Congress' clear intent to focus
the 1933 Act primarily on initial offerings... [tjhis Court can find no logical
reason in policy or equity for assuming... an odd departure from the Act's
focus"); Cox v. Eichler, 765 F. Supp. 601, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1990) ("This court also
reads the legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933 to restrict liability
under section 12(2) to initial offerings of securities and not to trades of listed
securities already in the marketplace."); T. Rowe Price New Horizons Funds v.
Preletz, 749 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Md. 1990) (citing the legislative history of the
1933 Act, and concluding that "[Section] 12 is inapplicable to sales of stock in
the secondary market").
70. 925 F.2d 682,684 (3d Cir. 1991).
STANDING UNDER SECTION 16
believe that the language and the legislative history of section
12(2) demonstrate that Congress did not there intend to protect
buyers in the aftermarket."71 According to the Ballay court, this is
consistent with the narrow scope of the 1933 Act because "[t]he
legislative history is devoid of any indication that the reach of
section 12(2) was intended to be broader than the limited scope of
sections 11 and 12(1)."72 Thus, Section 11's limited reach was
significant to the Ballay court's analysis 3 As the court explained,
Section 12 is positioned between Section 11 and Section 13 which
"deal with initial distributions.74 Accordingly, the Third Circuit
recognized that "Congress' placement of section 12(2) squarely
among 1933 Act provisions concerned solely with initial
distributions of securities, indicates that it designed section 12(2)
to protect buyers of initial offers against fraud and
misrepresentation." 75
The Third Circuit further reasoned that a broad reading of
Section 12 "would permit a buyer to recover under section 12(2)
for mere misrepresentations where that same buyer could not
meet the scienter, reliance, and causation elements of a section
10(b) daim [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." T6
Accordingly, the court concluded that Section 12(2) does not
"protect buyers in the aftermarket," but instead "provides a
remedy to buyers of securities only in the initial distributions."
Relying on Ballay's reasoning, several federal courts restricted
standing under Section 12 to initial purchasers.7a This same
71. Id.
72. Id. at 691. A cause of action under Section 12(1) may only be maintained
against a "seller" of securities. See gewerally Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (19SS).
This limitation means that a plaintiff may recover only from those who pass
title or were a "substantial factor" in the sale.
73. Balay, 925 F.2d at 691.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 688-89.
77. Id. at 684.
78. First Union Disc. Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44
(11th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e are persuaded by the Third Circuit's reasoning and hold
that section 12(2) of the 1933 Act does not apply to aftermarket transactions.");
Reed v. Prudential Secs. Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1285,1291 (S.D. Tex 1995) ("Courts
throughout the nation have followed the Third Circuit's reasoning in Ballay" in
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reasoning compelled courts to limit Section 11 standing to initial
purchasers.79
In Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressly
disagreed with Ballay and concluded that Section 12 applied to
aftermarket transactions.80 The circuit split regarding the scope of
Section 12 was resolved by the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.81 which rejected
Pacific Dunlop, confirmed the reasoning of Ballay, and signaled a
return to the 1933 Act's intended purpose.
IV. THE GUSTAFSON DECISION
In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,82 the Court considered whether
Section 12(2)83 could afford a remedy to a buyer challenging
misrepresentations allegedly made in a private sale transaction.
holding that "§ 12(2) applies only to initial offerings."), affd, 87 F.3d 1311 (5th
Cir. 1996); Bennett v. Bally Manufacturing Corp., 785 F. Supp. 559, 561-62
(D.S.C. 1992) ("[Tlhe clear weight of authority supports [the] contention that
§ 12(2) does not apply to secondary market transactions."); Professional Serv.
Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, Civ. A. No. 90-1326-B, 1992 WL 403639, at *2 (D. Kan.
1992) ("We hold that § 12(2) does not provide a cause of action to a purchaser in
the secondary trading of securities.") (citations omitted); Newman v.
Comprehensive Care, 794 F. Supp. 1513, 1524 (D. Or. 1992) (dismissing Section
12 claim because "the legislative history indicates that the 1933 Act was
designed to affect only new offerings of securities....") (citing Mix v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 720 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1989) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933)) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
79. In re Delmarva Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1293, 1309 (D. Del. 1992)
(Congress' intent in enacting the entire Securities Act was to regulate initial
offerings.... According to Ballay, Section 11 'deals with initial
distribution[s] ... not with secondary offerings. Plaintiffs have not alleged they
purchased newly issued shares in an initial offering. Therefore, the Section
11(a) claims will be dismissed for lack of standing.) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
80. 993 F.2d 578, 594 (7th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Gustafson v. Alloyd
Company, 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
81. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
82. Id.
83. Subsection 12(2) was recodified as Section 12(a)(2) in 1995. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 771, as amended Pub. L. No. 104-67, Title I § 105,109 Stat. 757 (Dec. 22,1995).
STANDING UNDER SECTION II
The district court, relying on Balay v. Legg Mason Wood Wraller,
Inc., 4 had granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment The Supreme Court upheld the district court's
decision, finding: "The intent of Congress and the design of the
statute require that § 12(2) liability be limited to public
offerings."'A5
The Supreme Court reached this conclusion after noting that
Section 12(2) provides an express cause of action against sellers
who make material misstatements "by means of a prospectus."ES
Noting that principles of statutory construction required the term
"prospectus" to be interpreted consistently among the various
provisions of the 1933 Act, the Court found that the term
"prospectus" 
-like a registration statementF'-referred to a
document prepared by an issuer in conjunction with a public
offering.BS
The Supreme Court also noted that Section 12(2) exempts
sales of government-issued securities.§ This exemption would
make no sense if Congress intended Section 12(2) to create
liability for secondary market transactions, because there could be
no explanation for immunizing private sellers of government-
issued securities in the secondary market "The exemption for
government-issued securities makes perfect sense" only when
Section 12(2) is construed to apply solely to new offerings,
because "it then becomes a precise and appropriate means of
giving immunity to governmental authorities."91
The Supreme Court further noted that the "primary
innovation of the 1933 Act was the creation of federal duties-for
the most part, registration and disclosure obligations-in
84. 925 F.2d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that "section 12(2) provides a
remedy to buyers of securities only in the initial distributions").
85. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578.
86. Id. at 564 (quoting Section 12(2)).
87. Id. at 569 ("By and large, only public offerings by an issuer of a security,
or by controlling shareholders of an issuer, require the preparation and filing of
registration statements.").
88. Id. at 568,569.
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connection with public offerings."92 The Court was therefore
"reluctant to conclude that § 12(2) creates vast additional
liabilities" -i.e., regulation of the secondary market-
that are quite independent of the new substantive obligations
the Act imposes. It is more reasonable to interpret the liability
provisions of the 1933 Act as designed for the primary
purposes of providing remedies for violations of the
obligations it had created. Indeed, §§ 11 and 12(1)-the
statutory neighbors of § 12(2)-afford remedies for violations
of those obligations. 93
Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that it was
"understandable" that Congress would give buyers the
extraordinary remedy of rescission under Section 12 without
requiring proof of fraud, only if the scope of that rule were
limited to new offerings, because those transactions are based on
"documents prepared with care, following well established
procedures," such as a prospectus (or a registration statement).94
To make the remedy of rescission under Section 12 available to
buyers in the secondary market, where communication is less
deliberate, would have the "practical effect" of giving buyers an
"option to rescind," thereby "impairing the stability" of the
securities market.95
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily upon the
legislative history shared by Sections 11 and 12, noting that
92. Id. For this proposition, Gusta/son cites the following: Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (the 1933 Act "was designed to provide
investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public
offerings"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975)
("The 1933 Act is a far narrower statute [than the Securities Exchange Act of
1934], chiefly concerned with disclosure and fraud in connection with offerings
of securities-primarily, as here, initial distributions of newly issued stock from
corporate issuers."); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979)
("Mhe 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new
offerings....").
93. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 572.
94. Id. at 578.
95. Id. A registration statement likewise is prepared with established
procedures and required information. See Shaw v. Digital Equip., 82 F.3d 1194,
1204 (1st Cir. 1996).
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
Section 12's "statutory neighbo[r]" -Section 11-applies only to
new distributions.96 Indeed, even the dissenters in Gustafon,
while disagreeing on the scope of Section 12(2), conceded that
Section 11 was limited to public offerings. Justice Ginsburg, in
dissent, noted that "[there is no dispute that [Sections 11 and
12(1)] apply only to public offerings-or, to be precise, to
transactions subject to registration." 7 Justice Thomas, in a
separate dissenting opinion, agreed: "Nor did Congress limit §
12(2) to issuers, as it chose to do with other provisions that are
limited to initial distributions."1-3
In reasoning that Section 12 applied exclusively to public
offerings of securities, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he
1933 Act, like every Act of Congress, should not be read as a
series of unrelated and isolated provisions."? The canons of
statutory construction espoused by the Gustafson Court thus
require consistent application of Sections 11 and 12.
Following Gustafson, courts uniformly have held that Section
12 clearly applies only to initial public offerings.0 Despite
96. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 571, 572. Gustafson's reading of the legislative
history of the 1933 Act is consistent with the Court's earlier decision in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the seminal decision on
statutory construction of the 1934 Act. Explaining the difference between the
1934 Act and the 1933 Act, the Blue Chip Stamps Court noted that "[t]he 1933 Act
is a far narrower statute chiefly concerned with disclosure and fraud in
connection with offerings of securities-primarily,... initial distributions of
newly issued stock from corporate issuers' Id. at 752. Furthermore, "Congress
left little doubt that its purpose in imposing the prospectus and registration
requirements of the 1933 Act was to the 'high pressure salesmanship rather
than careful counsel,' causing inflated new issues, through direct limitation by
the SEC of 'the selling arguments hitherto employed."' Id. at 752-53 (quoting
H.R. REu. NO. 73-85, pt. II, at 8 (1933)).
97. Gustafton, 513 U.S. at 600 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Transactions in
the secondary market are not subject to registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1)
(2000).
93. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at590 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 570.
100. Following Gustafson, courts have limited Section 12 liability to
misstatements made in connection with initial public offering of securities. See
Maldonado v. Domiguez, 137 F.3d 1, 8 (Ist Cir. 1993) ("the Supreme Court
conclusively decided that section 12(2) applies exNclusively to 'initial public
offerings"); In re WRT Secs. Litig., Nos. 96 CIV. 3610, 3611 (FK), 1997 WL
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Gustafson's clear statements regarding Section 11, courts have
nonetheless remained divided on that section's scope.
V. POST-GUSTAFSON CASELAW
A. Rejection of"Tracing"
In concluding that the scope of Section 12 is limited to initial
public offerings, the Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta that
Section 11 is similarly restricted. 01  Immediately following
Gustafson, courts interpreted Sections 11 and 12 consistently to
limit standing only to those who purchase shares in an initial
public offering. 02 These early decisions sounded the death knell
576023, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1997) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims under
Section 12(a)(2) because plaintiffs failed to allege that they purchased notes or
preferred stock in a public offering); Weinstein v. Jain, No. C-94-1015-EFL, 1995
WL 787549, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1995) ("the discussion in Gustafson dearly
indicates that the Court takes the view that Congress contemplated that Section
12(2) would apply only to public offerings by an issuer, and would not apply to
the redistribution of stock in the secondary market"); Baxter v. A.R. Baron &
Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,923 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1995) (dismissing
aftermarket purchasers' Section 12 claims); Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co.,
884 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1995) (dismissing aftermarket purchasers'
Section 12 claims).
101. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 571, 572 (noting that Section 12(2)'s "statutory
neighbors," Section 11, applies only to new public offerings).
102. See Gannon v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 566, 575 (D.N.J. 1996)
(holding that "§ 11 and § 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act apply only to stocks
bought in an initial public offering and not to stocks purchased through
secondary market transactions"); Warden v. Crown Am. Realty Trust, No. Civ.
A. 96-25j, 1998 WL 725946, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa Oct. 15, 1998) ("If plaintiffs' shares
were purchased in the secondary market, they would not be linked to a
registration statement... and the § 11 claim would fail... [In a market
transaction, it is difficult to conceive of how [shares) could be traced..."); In re
Summit Med. Sys. Inc., Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1070 (D. Minn. 1998)
("Section 11 is applicable only to shareholders who acquired their stock in the
IPO"); Flecker v. Hollywood Entm't Corp., 1997 WL 269488, at *2 (D. Or. Feb.
12, 1997) (claims under Sections 11 and 12 dismissed because "the 1933 Act
does not extend to aftermarket transactions under the reasoning of Gustafson");
Murphy v. Hollywood Entm't Corp., Civ. A. No. 95-1926, 1996 WL 393662, at *
4 (D. Or. May 9, 1996) (dismissing Section 11 claims because there is "no
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
for "tracing" as a means of extending standing under Section 11
to aftermarket purchasers.
Gould v. Harris03 was among the first reported decisions to
address Section 11 in light of Gustafson. In that case, the court
noted that the reasoning of Gustafson is equally applicable to
Sections 11 and 12 because these statutes share the same
legislative history and impose liability without proof of fraud or
reliance.10 Incorporating the Supreme Courtes reasoning, the
Gould court held that "neither section 11 nor section 12 extends to
securities purchases that are merely 'traceable' to the offering.
Under Gustafson, sections 11 and 12(2) apply only to purchases
made in the initial offering and not those purchased in the
secondary market"'10
In re WRT Energy Securities Litigationles similarly exemplifies
the strict construction employed in cases immediately following
Gustafron.107  In WRT, aftermarket purchasers acquired their
shares four days after the initial public offering.lU3 The WRT court
concluded that "the standing principles the Supreme Court
announced in Gustafson apply equally to Section 11 claims."G3
Despite the temporal proximity of the offering and the purchases,
material distinction between § 11 [claims] ... and those raised under § 12(2)
from the standpoint of the standing of aftermarket purchasers"); Zeid v. Open
Env't, No. 96-12466-EFH, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23469, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 16,
1997) (dismissing aftermarket purchasers' Section 11 claims); Brosious v.
Children's Place Retail Stores, 1S9 F.R.D. 13S, 144 (D.N.J. 1999) ('[Pjurchasers in
the secondary market have no cause of action under section 11 ... ."); Van de
Walle v. Salomon Bros., Inc., No. 9894, 1997 WL 633283 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1997)
("The majority of federal district courts that have considered the extent of
liability under § 11 since Gustafson have also held that purchases made in the
secondary market cannot give rise to an action under § 11.").
103. 929 F. Supp. 353,353 (C.D. Cal. 1996), abrosated by Hertzberg v. Dignity
Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 358.
105. Id. at 359.
106. No. 96 Civ. 3610,1997 WL 576023 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 15,1997).
107. See, e.g., In re Summit Med. Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 106s,
1070-71 (D. Minn. 1998) ("Ihis Court adopts the position in WRT, and finds
that Section 11 is applicable only to shareholders who acquired their stock in
the 1'O.").
108. WRT, 1997 WL 576023, at*6.
109. Id.
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the WRT court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for failure to allege
that they had purchased the shares in the offering itself.10 The
WRT court noted that its conclusion was consistent with the pre-
Gustafson case law acknowledging Section 11's limited scope.",
Thus, following Gould and WRT, the ability of an aftermarket
purchaser to maintain a Section 11 claim, based on a mere
allegation that shares could be traced, dearly was in question.
As the concept of "tracing" initially returned to Section 11
jurisprudence, it appeared limited in its applicability to the
"direct trace" theory described in Kirkwvood v. Taylor.1 2 As a
110. Id.
ill. Id. (quoting, inter alia, Langert v. Q-1 Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,445 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1974)) ("Those who
purchased stock directly from the underwriter on the basis of the registration
statement and prospectus possess a right of action under §§ 11 and 12 of the
1933 Act Those who purchased on the open market have a right of action
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Section 17 of the 1933 Act."); Ballay v. Legg
Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 691 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that "section
11 and section 12(1)... deal with initial distributions.., and are concerned
solely with initial distributions of securities").
112. 590 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Minn. 1984); see also Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No.
Civ. 96-1514, 1998 WL 1018624, at *21 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5,1998) (dismissing Section
11 claims because "[pilaintiffs have failed to allege any facts tracing their
purchase to the underwriters in their complaint"); Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp.
1361, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[Tihis Court concludes that § 11 is not applicable
to aftermarket transactions. The SAC contains no allegations that Plaintiffs
purchased their shares in Quickturn's IPO or that the shares they purchased
can be traced to the IPO. Therefore, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim
under § 11."); Lilley v. Charren, 936 F. Supp. 708, 716 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(requiring plaintiffs to plead "specific dates and facts" to establish a Section 11
claim). For example, in Fazio v. Palnieri, No. C96-1096D, slip op. at 7-8 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 10 1997) available at http://securities.stanford.edu, the court
explained:
[Tihe mere fact that a company has had a public offering does not
automatically mean that all purchasers of public shares have standing to bring
a § 11 claim. Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that their particular
purchases originate from the initial public offering. In this case, plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that their purchases are directly traceable to the initial
public offering. Plaintiffs have not alleged that they read the registration
statements or prospectus, and the purchase of shares in the secondary market
that were once part of an initial public offering does not, by itself, satisfy the
Gustafson requirement that the Securities Act apply to 'new offerings of
securities."'
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
result, only initial purchasers could "trace" their securities to the
offering.nl3
Nevertheless, as Section 11 claims increased after the
enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act114 some
courts seem again to have embraced the broad concept of
"tracing" and restricted Gustafson's applicability to Section 12.115
However, the decisions accepting "tracing" as a means of
conferring standing neither define its meaning nor explain how it
can or should be implemented.
B. Resurgence of "Tracing"
Despite Gustafson's clarity, a number of recent decisions have
reinjected confusion into this area of the law. For example,
In Harden v. Raffensperber, 933 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Ind. 1996), the court failed to
address the applicability of Gustafson on the Section 11 claims, but relied on
Kirlauood for the proposition that "[ilt is not sufficient that a security might have
been issued pursuant to a defective registration statement." Id. at 766. The
Harden court noted that "to be able to take advantage of the lower burden of
proof and almost strict liability available under [Section] 11, a plaintiff must
meet higher procedural standards," the "most significant" of which is
"tracing." Id. (citing Kirlatood, 590 F. Supp. at 1378)). Thus, to establish
standing, a plaintiff must show that the shares purchased were "newly issued."
Id. at 767. See also McKowan Lowe & Co., Ltd. v. Jasmine Ltd., No. 94-CV-5522,
2000 WL 33153132, at * 26 (D.N.J. June 30, 2000) ("lPiurchasers on the open or
secondary market have no cause of action under [Slection 11 because, by
definition, their purchases were not made pursuant to an initial public
offering.").
113. See Gannon v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp. 566,575 (D.N.J. 1996).
114. See Marc J. Sonnenfeld and Karen Pielsik Pohlmann, An Increx2 in
Section 11 Claims Against Companies and a Potential Defense to Tracing - Part I,
2/99 iET. CoRp. Couxs. 17, (col 1) (Feb. 1999) (discussing an increase in
Section 11 claims and the divergent lines of authority regarding the viability of
"tracing"); see also Joseph A. Allerhand and Benjamin M. Hain, W1here Do
Secondary Marct Purchasers Stand After Gustafson - Part I, h=. COrPP. COULNs.
4, (col. 1) (Feb. 1999) (noting the lack of consensus on the issue of Section 11
standing after Gustafson).
115. Brian Murray, Aftermarket Purchaser Standing Under § 11 of the $ccuritics
Act of 1933, 73 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 633, 643-44 (Summer 1999) (discussing a recent
trend to permit "tracing").
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Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings"16 was one of the first decisions
after Gustafson to conclude that "tracing" remained a viable
means of conferring standing on aftermarket purchasers. The
Celestial Seasonings court stated that Gustafson did not address "in
dicta or otherwise" the scope of Section 11,117 and presumed- on a
motion to dismiss-that the plaintiffs could trace their shares to
the offering." 8 In so holding, the court noted that "tracing" was a
merits issue that should not be resolved at the outset of the
litigation.11 9 The court, however, offered no explanation of how
plaintiffs could trace their shares.
In Adair v. Bristol Technology Systems,' 20 the court reviewed
Barnes v. Osofsky 21 and its progeny, noting that "[i]t has been the
law in this Circuit for over thirty years that a plaintiff who can
trace their [sic] securities to a registered offering has standing to
sue under [Section 11] of the Securities Act for a defect in that
registration."122 Like Celestial Seasonings, the Adair court found
that Gustafson was limited to Section 12 and had no bearing on
interpretation of Section 11.123 Reviewing the legislative history
so persuasive to the Gustafson Court, the Adair court found
congressional intent to be "at best ambiguous about whether
purchasers in the aftermarket who can trace their securities back
to the defective registration statement have standing.124
Following Adair, a pronounced split developed among district
courts regarding the aftermarket purchaser's ability to maintain a
cause of action under Section 11 by invoking a broad concept of
"traceablity."125
116. 178 F.R.D. 545 (D. Colo. 1998).
117. Id. at 555.
118. Id. at 556.
119. Id. at 557.
120. 179 F.R.D. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
121. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
122. Adair, 179 F.R.D. at 130.
123. Id. at 131.
124. Id. at 132.
125. Feiner v. SS&C Techs., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251-52 (D. Conn. 1999)
("[Any purchaser has standing to sue under Section 11 so long as the securities
purchased can be traced back to the offering containing the allegedly defective
registration statement." (quoting In re Fine Host Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67
(D. Conn. 1998)); In re Number Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp.
STANDING UNDER SECTION 11
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was
the first post-Gustafron federal appellate court to address
aftermarket purchasers' standing under Section 11. In Hertzberg
v. Dignity Partners, Inc.,m6 the Ninth Circuit observed that the
Gustafson Court "gave no indication that it intended [restrictions
on standing] to apply to Section 11."12 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
ignored the substantial discussion regarding Section 11 in the
Gustafson decision and purported to conduct an exercise in
statutory construction. However, the Hertzberg court's
interpretation of Section 11 focused on a single phrase of the
statute which provides that suit may be maintained by "any
person acquiring such security."123 Based on this phrase alone,
the Ninth Circuit expanded Section 11 to aftermarket
2d 1, 11-12 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[A] plaintiff may satisfy Section 11 standing
requirements by purchasing securities 'traceable to' an initial public offering.");
In re Websecure, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 364 (D. Mass. 1993); Cooperman v.
Individual, Inc., No. 96-12272,1998 WL 953726 (D. Mass. May 27,1993), affd on
other grounds, 171 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1999); Olczyk v. Cerion Techs., Inc., 721
N.E.2d 732, 743 (I. App. Ct 1999), appeal denied, 729 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. 2000)
(accepting allegations of traceability for purposes of Section 11 standing).
Another court has conferred standing under Section 11 on the mere allegation
that shares were acquired "pursuant to" a misleading prospectus. In re
Paraclesus Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 626, 632 (S.D. Tex. 1998), motion gramted Inj
61 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D. Tex. 1998). The Paraclesus court made no effort to
distinguish between Sections 11 and 12 nor did it explain what constitutes a
purchase "pursuant to" a prospectus.
126. 191 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 1999).
127. Id. at 1080.
128. Id. at 1081. Analysis of the same statutory language has led other courts
to construe the class of plaintiffs under Section 11 narrowly. See e.g., Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875,877-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cited
with approval in Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967). In Colonial
Realty, the plaintiffs contended that all persons "who acquired a security of the
same class as the security issued under the registration statement" should have
a remedy under Section 11. Id. at 877. The court examined other provisions of
the 1933 Act and concluded that "such security" as used in Section 11 means
the "securities offered to the public under the registration statement" Id. at 878.
The meaning of the phrase "such security" together with the legislative history
of the 1933 Act led "to the conclusion that by the term 'such security' Congress
meant the securities issued and sold pursuant to the registration statement and
not all securities of the same class as those registered." Id. at 879.
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purchasers.129 In focusing on a single phrase to guide its statutory
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court's
directive to interpret statutes as a whole and not rely on isolated
provisions.130 With citation to Barnes, the Hertzberg court also
endorsed an expansive application of the so-called "tracing"
doctrine -without any explanation of its meaning.'31
The Tenth Circuit reached the same result in Joseph v. Wiles,132
holding that aftermarket purchasers could maintain an action
under Section 11 provided "they can demonstrate they bought
their securities pursuant to the registration statement"133 Because
the issuer in Joseph had only one offering, the inquiry ended. In
reaching this conclusion the Tenth Circuit distinguished
Gustafson, reasoning that the Supreme Court addressed neither
standing nor public offerings.134 The Joseph court further
disregarded the legislative history of Section 11, noting that it
"cuts both ways."35 However, the court pointed to the lone
passage which could be construed as favoring a broad
interpretation of Section 11.136
As appellate courts have addressed the issue, lower courts
129. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1081. Given its expansive vision of "tracing," the
Hertzberg court found it unnecessary to decide whether plaintiffs who
purchased a security within the applicable prospectus delivery requirements
had standing under Section 11. Id. at 1080 n.3. The flaws in the extension of an
offering based upon prospectus delivery requirements are discussed infra notes
135 to 150.
130. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Company, 513 U.S. 561, 569, 570 (1995) ("The
[Securities Act of 1933J, like every Act of Congress, should not be read as a
series of unrelated and isolated provisions," it must be "interpreted as a
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.").
131. Hertzberg, 191 F.3d at 1080 n.4.
132. 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000).
133. Id. at 1160.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1159. The Tenth Circuit noted that the legislative history provides
that the 1933 Act "only affects new offerings of securities .... It does not affect
the ordinary redistribution of securities." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. II,
at 5 (1933)). The court further noted that "the civil remedies accorded.., are
given to all purchasers... regardless of whether they bought their securities at
the time of the original offer or at some later date." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No.
73-85, pt. IIl, at 22).
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have reassessed earlier decisions precluding aftermarket
purchasers from asserting Section 11 claims,137 resulting in a
significant expansion of Section 11 liability.l-3 For example, in
Danis v. USN Communications, the court ruled that "Section 11
contains no restriction on the class of potential daimants."139
Several recent decisions from federal courts in New York also
have extended Section 11 standing to aftermarket purchasers by
implementing tracing without an explanation of how such
allegations can be substantiated.140 These cases narrowly construe
Gustafton to apply exclusively to Section 12. For example, in
Salomon Smith Barney v. Asset Securitization Corporation, the court
137. See, e.g., In re Southern Pac. Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 83 F. Supp. 2d
1172,1175 (D. Or. 1999) ("[Ihe [Hertzberg] court concluded that plaintiffs could
maintain a section 11 claim for after-market transactions. There is no dispute
that this holding effectively overrules my prior order dismissing plaintiffs'
section 11 claims.").
133. See In re Prison Realty Secs. Litig., 117 F. Supp 2d 631 (M.D. Tenn. Feb.
17, 2000) (under Hertzberg plaintiffs who "obtained shares issued pursuant to
and traceable to" the registration statement have standing under Section 11); In
re Transcrypt Int'l Sec. Litig., 98 CV 3099,1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17540, at *31 (D.
Neb. Nov. 4, 1999) (aftermarket purchasers "have standing to pursue a claim
under § 11 as long as they can trace the purchase of their shares back to the
October 1997 offering") (citing Hertzberg, 191 F.3d 1076); Giarraputo v.
Unimprovident Corp., No. Civ. 99-301-PC, 2000 WL 1701294, at I8 (D. Me. Nov.
8, 2000) (following Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2000) and holding
that aftermarket purchasers have standing under Section 11).
139. 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 932 (N.D. M11. 999). The Danis decision does not
purport to limit standing to those who can trace their securities to a registration
statement, but rather confers standing on all aftermarket purchasers.
140. Salomon Smith Barney v. Asset Securitization Corp., No. 98 Civ. 41S6,
1999 WL 1095605, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1999); Milman v. Box Hill Sys. Corp.,
192 F.R.D. 105, 109 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000) (noting that secondary market
purchasers who can trace their shares to a registered offering have standing to
assert claims under § 11); In re Ultrafem Inc. Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 673, 694
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2000) ("Contrary to Section 12(2)'s standing requirements,
standing under Section 11 is not limited to initial purchasers."); In re American
Bank Note Holographics Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6,2000)
(recognizing, in dicta, the dispute over Section 11 standing); In re Twvinlab Corp.
Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 193, 202 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2000) ("Standing under
Section 11 is not limited to purchasers who directly participated in the public
offering covered by the allegedly misleading registration statement and
prospectus.").
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stated that "[i]t has long been the law in this circuit that
secondary market purchasers are protected against defects in the
registration by § 11, provided only that they can trace their
security to the registered offering."14 Thus, these courts purport
to follow Barnes v. Osoftky42 and allow secondary market
purchasers to pursue Section 11 claims.
The decisions invoking "tracing" as a means of extending
Section 11 to the aftermarket fail to provide substantive analysis,
jeopardize the consistent interpretation of the statutory scheme,
and allow unfounded claims to be litigated.143 Additionally, as
many recent Section 11 cases have involved initial public
offerings, courts have rejected the need to assess a "tracing"
argument, reasoning that all shares are "new" and therefore can
be traced to the registration statement.'44 This superficial analysis
overlooks the reality of the securities markets. Although "new"
shares may be injected into the public market in an initial public
offering, there may be a pre-existing market for the securities.
For example, in In re Quarterdeck Office Systems, Inc. Securities
Litigation,45 shares issued in an IPO supplemented a market of
unregistered shares trading pursuant to Rule 144.146 Accordingly,
the court recognized that it could not assume that all shares
trading in the market were issued in the IPO.147
141. No. 98 Civ. 4186,1999 WL 1095605, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,1999).
142. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
143. See In re Fine Host Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67-68 (D.Conn. 1998)
(finding mere allegation of "tracing" sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss).
144. See Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000); Feiner v. SS&C
Technologies Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 n.3 (D. Conn. 1999) (summarily
assuming "tracing" because claims involve an IFO).
145. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19806 (C.D. Cal. September 30,1993).
146. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2001).
147. See In re Quarterdeck at *9 (C.D. Cal. September 30, 1993). Similarly, in
Lilley v. Charren, the court dismissed a Section 11 claim without prejudice
because "the market eventually contained shares that were not issued pursuant
to the prospectuses, it does appear that plaintiffs must amend their pleadings to
allege the specific dates and facts to establish the representative plaintiffs'
standing for a section 11 claim." 936 F. Supp. 708, 716 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
Although the Lilley court recognized "tracing" as a means of establishing
Section 11 standing, it apparently required a "direct trace" to demonstrate the
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Upon the commencement of the initial public offerings, the
previously issued shares find a new market and thus are
commingled with the newly issued shares. Accordingly, even in
the context of an initial public offering, an assessment of standing
must be undertaken. If courts allow "tracing" to be invoked as a
means of establishing standing for aftermarket purchasers, a clear
statement of what "tracing" means must be provided. Without
undertaking this necessary analysis, courts are conferring federal
jurisdiction on the basis of conjecture and speculation. Moreover,
these decisions fail to account for the significant distinctions
betveen initial purchasers and aftermarket purchasers, including,
significantly, the latter's access to superior information about the
security.
C. Extension of Offerings Based upon Prospectus Deliven!
Requirements
As a recognition of Section 11's and Section 12s limitation to
initial purchasers, another question is being raised in district
courts: When does an offering end and secondary trading begin?
Although the answer is quite simple-an offering ends once the
newly issued securities are distributed by the underwriters ,13-
proponents of an expansive interpretation of Section 11 have
advanced a variant of "tracing" that involves extending an initial
public offering for a prescribed period of time. 49 Consequently,
some have argued that a public offering should be extended for
the period set forth under Section 4(3)'ED of the 1933 Act and Rule
174,151 which require dealers, in certain circumstances, to deliver a
prospectus within either twenty-five, forty or ninety days after
requisite nexus between the offering and the purchase of securities.
148. See, e.g., Kenilworth Partners L.P. v. Cendant Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 417,
426 (D.N.J. 1999) ("a distribution refers to an offering of securities... and is
complete when the securities come to rest in the hands of the investing public").
149. See Joseph S. Allerhand and Benjamin M. Hain, Rltere Do Secondary
Market Purchzasers Stand After Gustafson? - Part II, 3/99 Metro. Corp. Couns.
18, (col. 1) (Iar. 1999) (setting forth the open issues of standing after Gustafson).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (2000).
151. 17 C.F.R § 230.174 (2001).
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the effective date of a registration statement.'5 2 Some courts have
accepted this argument and extended the period of an offering
beyond the initial distribution of securities, thereby conferring
standing upon all purchasers who acquired their securities within
the time prescribed for the delivery of a prospectus by dealers. 5 3
While most courts have addressed the prospectus delivery
issue in the context of Section 12, some courts have expanded the
rationale to encompass Section 11 claims. In so doing, courts
erroneously have stated that Section 11 limits its application to
sales conducted by means of a prospectus.15 4 This is a significant
error. Section 11 concerns representations and omissions in a
registration statement, not in a prospectus. Extension of an
offering based upon prospectus delivery requirements for the
purposes of Section 11 is illogical because there is no requirement
152. Under Section 4(3), the delivery of a prospectus is required for
transactions consummated within 40 days of a security first being offered to the
public by an issuer or underwriter. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(A). When the transaction
involves "securities constituting the whole or part of an unsold allotment to or
subscription by such dealer as a participant in the distribution of such securities
by the issuer or through an underwriter," the applicable period for prospectus
delivery is 90 days. Id. at § (3)(C). Rule 174 shortens the applicable delivery
period in certain circumstances. 17 C.F.R. § 230.174; see also Murray, supra note
115, at 648 (advocating the expansion of Section 11 standing based on
prospectus delivery requirements). Murray wrongly notes that Section 4(3)
applies equally to Sections 11 and 12. Id. at 649. There is simply no requirement
that a registration statement be delivered to purchasers at any time. This
significant distinction compels the conclusion that Section 4(3) is inapplicable to
Section 11.
153. See, e.g., Wade v. Indus. Funding Corp., No. C 92-0343,1993 WL 650837,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1993) (conferring standing, for purposes of Section 12
alone, on all who purchased a security within 90 days of an initial public
offering); In re Proxima Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 93-1139-IEG, 1994 WL 374306, at
*11 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 1994) (concluding "that plaintiffs have stated a claim for
relief under § 12(2) only in so far as their purchases were made either in the IPO
or within 90 days of the date of the IPO").
154. Murphy v. Hollywood Entn't, No. Civ. 95-1926, 1996 WL 393662, at *4
(D. Or. May 9, 1996); Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. Civ. 96-1514, 1998 WL
1018624, at *21 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998) ("Section 11 limits its application to sales
conducted 'by means of a prospectus' indicating a connection to a prospectus
delivery requirement."). Section 11 contains no such language. See 15 U.S.C. §
77k (2000).
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that a registration statement ever be delivered to a purchaser.133
Moreover, with respect to both Sections 11 and 12, the
extension of an offering based upon Section 4(3) and Rule 174
simply ignores that the 1933 Act contains important exemptions
from the prospectus delivery requirements. For example, Section
4(4) exempts unsolicited brokerage transactions providing-
The provisions of section 77e of this title shall not apply
to.. .(4) brokers' transactions executed upon customers'
orders on any exchange or in the over-the-counter market but
not the solicitation of such orders.5 b
Thus, by the express terms of the statute, the prospectus
delivery requirements of Section 4(3)(B) and Rule 174 apply only
to a narrow class of transactions and not to an unsolicited over-
the-counter trade- the ordinary aftermarket transaction.'57 When
enacting the 1933 Act, Congress made clear that Sections 3 and 4
exempt from their requirements "transactions by individuals;
[and] the execution by brokers of customer's orders in [the] open
market"5 3 With respect to the blanket exemption of unsolicited
customers' orders from the prospectus delivery requirements of
Section 5, Congress further explained:
Paragraph 2 [now Paragraph 41 exempts the ordinary
brokerage transaction. Individuals may thus dispose of their
securities according to the method that is now customary
without any restrictions imposed either upon the individual or
155. Even cases that wrongly have "extended" a public offering for the
purposes of liability under Section 12 by reference to the prospectus delivery
requirement, have recognized that such requirements have no applicability to
Section 11. See, e.g., Brosious v. Children's Place Retail Stores, 189 F.R.D. 133,
144 (D.N.J. 1999).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (2000); see also H.R. RPI. No. 73-5, pt. llI, at 16 (1933)
("Paragraph (2) [now Paragraph (4)] exempts the ordinary broherage
transaction."); Prospectus Delivery for Afteiniarket Triasactions, Securities Act
Release Nos. 33,6763,34,25546,1938 SEC LEXIS 669 (April 4,193S).
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (exempting from the prospectus delivery
requirements "brokers' transactions executed upon customers' orders on any
exchange or in the over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such
orders").
153. 11R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. II, at 6.
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the broker. This exemption also assures an open market for
securities at all times .... 159
Accordingly, the extension of Section 11 to aftermarket
purchasers based on the prospectus delivery requirement of
Section 4(3) and Rule 174 is illogical when only a small portion of
those transactions-those which are solicited to buy the stock-
are subject to the prospectus delivery requirements of the 1933
Act in the first place.
The prospectus delivery requirements for dealers may make
sense from an administrative standpoint. However, when
applied in a judicial context to confer standing, the time frames
are arbitrarily drawn. For example, securities sold pursuant to a
prospectus and issued by a company subject to the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act are not subject to the prospectus
delivery requirements of Section 4(3).160 Accordingly, purchasers
in the secondary market acquiring securities the day after the
completion of the initial public offering would not have standing
to pursue claims under Section 12(a)(2) because there was no
waiting period, and because dealers, upon the completion of the
initial public offering, were immediately exempt under Section
4(3) from the prospectus delivery requirements.
In contrast, dealers in securities issued by a company not
previously subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act
would be subject to the secondary market prospectus delivery
requirements under Section 4(3). Accordingly, those purchasers
would have standing to pursue claims under Sections 11 and
12(a)(2). There is simply no logical basis for differentiating
between these two groups of purchasers. The logical conclusion,
and the one compelled by Gustafson, is that neither group of
secondary purchasers has standing under Sections 11 and
12(a)(2).
Furthermore, the structure of the regulatory scheme also
militates against a correlation between the prospectus delivery
requirements and the civil remedy provisions of the 1933 Act.
Section 4(3) and Rule 174 apply to dealers-persons outside the
159. Id. at 16.
160. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.174(b) (2001).
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class of permissible defendants in a Section 11 action. The
imposition of liability on issuers, directors, experts and
underwriters based upon requirements applicable to dealers is
absurd. Moreover, Rule 174 is not the regulation governing
prospectus delivery in an offering.161 Rule 434 governs delivery
of prospectuses in certain firm commitment underwritten
offerings, and does not provide for the arbitrary "extension" of an
offering162 Pursuant to Rule 434, a prospectus must be sent prior
to or contemporaneously with a trading confirmation, or must
accompany or precede delivery of the securities.6 3 Accordingly,
Rule 434 addresses initial distributions and not open market
transactions through dealers.
The rejection of the arbitrary extension of an offering for
purposes of Section 11 based upon prospectus delivery
requirements dates back to the origins of the "tracing" doctrine
itself.*64 Indeed, even the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC") has rejected a correlation between the scope of the
civil remedies of the 1933 Act and prospectus delivery
requirements.i6s The prospectus delivery requirements therefore
have no applicability to considerations of standing for purposes
161. In proposing amendments to Rule 174, the Securities and Exchange
Commission expressly noted that Rule 174 applies to "secondary market
transactions" -not distributions. See Prospects Delivery Durings Quiet Period,
Securities Act Release No. 33,66S2,1936 SEC LEXIS 119 (Dec. 18,1936).
162. 17 C.F.R. § 230.434 (2001).
163. Id. at § 230.434(a)(2)(i)(ii).
164. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269,272 n.1 (2d Cir. 1967). In Barnes, the
Second Circuit recognized that:
Appellants note that the impracticability of determining at the moment of
purchase whether old or new shares are being acquired has led dealers to
comply with the requirements of § 5(b)(2) as to the delivery of a prospectus by
doing this on all sales within the period established by § 4(3) .... Wule this
may enable a purchaser of shares other than those registered to rely on § 12(2)
upon an appropriate showing, it does not lead to the conclusion that § 11
applies. Id.
165. See 63 Fed. Reg. 67174, 67228-29 (Dec. 4,1993) ("When we adopted Rule
174, we intended simply to express when prospectus delivery was needed. We
did not intend to delineate when the remedies provisions in the Securities Act
would or would not apply."'). As amicus in Gushtfson z. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561
(1995), the SEC argued that Section 12 should extend to aftermarket trading.
The Supreme Court expressly considered and rejected that argument. Id. at 579.
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of Section 11.
VI. THE STATUTORY SCHEME REQUIRES SECTION 11's LIMITATION TO
INITIAL PURCHASERS
A. The Express Language of Section 11 Mandates a Restriction to
Initial O&krings
Despite some courts' statements to the contrary, Congress'
intent to limit the scope of the 1933 Act to new offerings of
securities is reflected in the language of Section 11 itself.
Damages under Section 11 are limited expressly as follows: "In no
case shall the amount recoverable under this section exceed the
price at which the security was offered to the public.166 With
respect to underwriter liability, the statute further provides: "In
no event shall any underwriter... be liable in any suit or as a
consequence of suits authorized under subsection (a) for damages
in excess of the total price at which the securities underwritten by
him and distributed to the public were offered to the public."167
These limitations on damages make sense only when
standing under Section 11 is restricted to initial purchasers. An
aftermarket purchaser who acquired shares at a price inflated
significantly above the offering price would not be made whole
under Section 11.168 Under this likely scenario, an aftermarket
166. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (2000).
167. Id. at § 77k(e). The sole exception to the limitation on the underwriter's
total liability applies where the "underwriter shall have knowingly received
from the issuer for acting as an underwriter some benefit, directly or indirectly,
in which all other underwriters similarly situated did not share in proportion to
their respective interests in the underwriting." Id. Thus, the damages from an
underwriter relate exclusively to the participation in or benefit derived from an
initial offering.
168. Although the limitations on the damages under Section 11 make sense
only when restricted to initial purchasers, some have argued that the damages
provisions require an expansive reading of the statute. See Alan R. Palmiter,
Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 62-64
(1999); see also Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2000). Professor
Palmiter asserts that the Gustafson Court improperly "rewrote" the 1933 Act,
and that Section 11's damages provision contemplates an extension to
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purchaser would not be fully compensated for his or her loss
under Section 11. Given the remedial purposes of the federal
securities laws, 69 it is illogical to presume that Congress intended
such a result if Section 11 was meant to apply to aftermarket
purchasers. 70 In contrast, under a Section 10(b) action, damages
are commonly calculated as the difference between the price paid
or received and the security's true value at the time of the
transaction, thus fully compensating the aftermarket purchaser
for his or her loss.Y,
In determining the scope of the federal securities laws, the
Supreme Court traditionally has examined the available damages
to define the parameters of the potential plaintiff class. For
example, the Gustafson Court concluded that the right of
rescission would make no sense as a remedy for Section 12 if that
statute provided a cause of action for secondary market
transactions.172 Similarly, in limiting the availability of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to actual purchasers and sellers of securities,
the Blue Chip Stamps Court examined the damages available
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.173 Because speculative damages
secondary market transactions. Palmiter, at 64. This reading of the statute,
however, contorts the statutory language.
169. See, e.g., Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478, 482-83 (S.D. Cal. 1939) ("It
is evident that Congress intended to make the action, notwithstanding its origin
in fraud, purely compensatory. And so, it provided for the recovery of the
price paid."). Only those who purchased at the offering price will receive
compensatory damages. Id. at 483 ("The object of the Congress was to
compensate a person for the depreciation in the value-the actual value of his
security.').
170. See e.g. Blue Chip Stamps v. Mator Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 753-54
(1975). The Court noted that the restrictive recovery available under the 1933
Act confirmed that "Congress did not intend to extend a private cause of action
for money damages to the non-purchasing offeree of a stock offering registered
under the 1933 Act for loss of the opportunity to purchase due to an overly
pessimistic prospectus." Id.
171. Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F2d 289,297 (3d Cir. 1991); Harris
v. Am. inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220,224-25 (8th Cir. 1975).
172. 513 U.S. 561, 576 (1995) ("The use of the term 'prospectus to refer to
public solicitations e.plains as well Congress' decision in § 12(2) to grant
buyers a right to rescind without proof of reliance.").
173. 421 U.S. 723, 735-36 (1975) ("The principal express non-derivative
private civil remedies, created by Congress contemporaneously with the
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are not contemplated by the securities laws, the Blue Chip Stamps
Court concluded that standing must be limited to those who
actually traded in a security.174 Thus, the Supreme Court has
recognized that damages provisions are important-if not
determinative-indicia of the class of persons who fall within the
zone of interests protected by a statute. Following this reasoning,
an examination of the damages provisions of Section 11 compels
the conclusion that only those who purchased at the offering
price are within the protection of the statute.
The imposition of liability without proof of scienter or
reliance also supports the conclusion that Section 11 has limited
availability as a remedy. Recognizing the different stance in
which access to additional information places subsequent
purchasers, Congress required that a plaintiff prove actual
reliance on a registration statement when the security is acquired
after the release of an earnings statement.17 This difference in
passage of § 10(b), for violations of various provision of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
are by their terms expressly limited to purchasers or sellers of securities.").
174. Id. at 736.
175. It should be noted that if a purchaser acquires a security more than
twelve months after the effective date of the registration statement, a showing
of reliance is required to prevail on a Section 11 claim. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000)
("If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its security holders an earnings statement covering a period of at
least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration
statement, then the right of recovery under this subsection shall be conditioned
on proof that such person acquired the security relying on such untrue
statement in the registration statement...."). Although some courts have used
this language to read Section 11 expansively, see, e.g., Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d
1155 (10th Cir. 2000); Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, 178 F.R.D. 545, 556 (D.
Colo. 1998), this provision is consistent with a limitation on standing to initial
purchasers. Commentators have noted that, unlike today, public offerings were
not completed in the course of mere hours. Rather, distribution of the shares
from the initial public offering might not be completed for months. As the 1933
Act's legislative history explicitly recognized, some offerings lasted more than
one year. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. III, at 15 (1933) ("generally speaking, the
average public offering has been distributed within a year") (emphasis added);
see also Pastuszenski, et. al, Recent Developments in Standing Under Sections 12(2)
and 11 of the 1933 Act: The Broad Sweep of Gustafson, SC73 ALI-ABA 665, 674
(May 29, 1998) (noting that Congress recognized that in 1933 many public
offerings were only completed over an extended period of time far longer than
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required proof demonstrates that Congress did not intend to
provide a remedy under Section 11 for purchasers with access to
additional, post-registration statement sources of information
regarding a security. Accordingly, the statute itself mandates a
narrow interpretation.
B. The Statutory Scheme Confirms Section 11's Narrow Applicabilitu
The interplay of the liability provisions of the 1933 Act and
1934 Act likewise demonstrates that Section 11's protections are
limited to initial purchasers. Expansion of Section 11 to
aftermarket purchasers renders Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, superfluous. Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 govern secondary market trading, and
significantly, require proof of scienter and reliance.17 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of the 1934 Act is
to protect investors from manipulation in transactions "upon
securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets.""n
Affording standing to aftermarket purchasers under Section 11 of
the 1933 Act would result in the imposition of strict liability on
issuers with respect to transactions in the secondary market-a
draconian result unwarranted by the language of the statute or
judicial precedent 7 8
one day).
176. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 1S5 (1976); sce aIso In re Summit
Med. Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070-71 (D. Minn. 1993) ("If
secondary market purchasers are to recover for an alleged material
misstatement or omission made in connection with their share purchases, they
must do so under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.").
177. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
178. The distinctions between the class of plaintiffs under Section 11 and
those under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act have long been recognized. As Judge
Frank observed:
A suit under Sec. 11 of the 1933 Act requires no proof of fraud or deceit, and
such a suit may be maintained only by one who comes within a narrow class
of persons .... But proof of fraud is required in suits under Sec. 10(b) of the
1934 Act .... Congress reasonably, and without inconsistency, allowed suits
of that sort which (1) are free of the restrictions applicable to a suit under Sec.
11 of the 1933 Act and (2) which are not confined to those persons who may
properly sue under that section but which include all who are the victims of
the fraud.
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To give full effect to the regulatory scheme of the federal
securities laws, the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act must be construed
together "so as not to eviscerate requirements for recovery under
another complementary provision."179 In fact, the Ballay court
concluded that "the different remedies available under section
12(2) and section 10(b) support restricting the application of
Section 12(2) to initial distributions.'180 In so holding, the court
reasoned that applying "the more lenient requirements of Section
12(2) [to secondary market trading] would effectively eliminate
the use of section 10(b) by securities purchasers. Such a
construction would overrule, sub silencio, section 10(b) as a
remedy for purchasers."18
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,82 the Court contrasted the
remedies available under the 1933 and 1934 Acts in concluding
that actions under Section 10(b) require scienter. The Court there
held that Section 10(b) liability could not be predicated on
negligent conduct because "[s]uch extension would allow causes
of action covered by §§ 11, 12(2), and 15 to be brought instead
under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully
drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions."183 It is
therefore clear that, if Congress had intended the scope of Section
11 to overlap to such a large degree with Section 10(b) of the 1934
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951).
179. Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 692 (3d Cir.
1991). United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398 (1999), confirms the
reasoning of Gustafson and Ballay and makes clear that a diminution of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by expanding Section 11, is an impermissible result.
Interpreting an illegal gratuity statute, the Supreme Court instructed that when
"regulations and statutes litterl" the field, "[aibsent a text that clearly requires
it, we ought not to expand this one piece of the regulatory puzzle so
dramatically as to make many other pieces misfits." Id. at 412. The Court
emphasized that when a statute "can linguistically be interpreted to be either a
meat axe or a scalpel it should reasonably be taken to be the latter." Id. This
same reasoning requires that Section 11 be interpreted as a "scalpel" as well.
180. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 693.
181. Id. at 692-93 (citations omitted); see Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S.
516, 575 (1995) (noting that the expansion of Section 12 to the secondary market
would destabilize the financial markets).
182. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
183. Id. at 210.
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Act, there would have been either: (1) little need to create Section
10(b), or (2) Section 10(b) would reflect this intent Moreover, had
Congress intended Section 11 to overlap with Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, then certainly Congress would have made this point
dear in the course of drafting the comprehensive update of the
federal securities laws set forth in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.184
Finally, there is no justification rooted in necessity, fairness or
common sense to extend the protections of Section 11, which
regulate disclosure in a registration statement, to purchasers in
the secondary market who have a remedy under Section 10(b)
and who never saw a registration statement If aftermarket
purchasers believe themselves to be aggrieved, Congress has
provided a remedy for them under Section 10 and Rule 10b-5.
As the Supreme Court has held, only one provision of the
1933 Act extends to aftermarket trading-Section 17(a)XS Section
17(a) of the 1933 Act proscribes fraudulent conduct in connection
with the sale of securities.16 The Supreme Court has concluded
that Section 17, which does not use the terms "prospectus" or
"registration statement" at all, is the sole provision of the 1933
Act applicable to secondary market trading and is "a deliberate
184. PL 104-67,109 Stat. 737,1995 HR 1058 (Dec. 22,1995).
185. Gustafson, 513 US. at 576. Section 17(a) is a criminal statute that can also
be enforced in a civil injunctive action by the SEC; ROBERT CHARLEs CLAri,
CORPORATE LAW § 17.4.3 (1986). Although courts were once split on whether
Section 17 provided a private right of action, the weight of current authority
holds that private litigants may not bring suit under Section 17. Se also
Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 15-17 (1st Cir. 1993); Finkel v. The
Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169,174-75 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing cases).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000). Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instrument of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact necessary in order to mae the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which op=tes
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
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departure from the general scheme of the Act."187 The Ballay
court also found the broad purpose of Section 17 inapplicable to
Sections 11 and 12 noting, that "[iln contrast to section 17(a) ...
[t]he legislative history is devoid of any indication that the reach
of section 12(2) was intended to be broader than the limited scope
of sections 11 and 12(1)."188 Finally, the legislative history of
Section 17 explicitly provides that "fraud or deception in the sale
of securities may be prosecuted regardless of whether.., or not it
is of the class of securities exempted under sections 11 or 12."189
Thus, the history and interpretation of Section 17 confirm the
narrow scope of Section 11.
Section 18 of the 1934 Act'90 also creates a private right of
action and has been viewed as a parallel to Section 11, affording a
civil remedy to secondary market purchasers injured by
violations of the periodic reporting requirements. 91 In contrast to
Section 11, to have standing under Section 18, a plaintiff must
have purchased or sold a security in actual reliance upon an
omission or false statement in a public filing. Commentators
have recognized the difficulty inherent in maintaining a cause of
187. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 577.
188. Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 692 (3d Cir.
1991).
189. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-74, at 4 (1933)).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2000): Section 18 provides in pertinent part
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or
regulation thereunder... which sta..ement was at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for
damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis added).
191. See Keller & Gelhmann, supra note 7, at 350; see also W.A. Krueger Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Neb. 1979) ("In
the context of Section 13(a) annual reports and supplementary documents,
actions for damages have been judicially limited to plaintiffs who have
standing to proceed under Section 18(a).").
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action under Section 18.1 Actual reliance on the allegedly false
filing is necessary to satisfy Section 18; mere reliance on market
information will not sufficej93 Moreover, a defendant in a Section
18 case has the substantial defense that "he acted in good faith
and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading."194 Commentators have observed that the element of
actual reliance makes certification of a class under Section 18
virtually impossible.193 The parallel drawn between Section 18
and Section 11, however, demonstrates the narrow applicability
of private rights of action based upon false or misleading
statements in documents filed with the SEC. Perhaps this is
because Congress created these rights of action to effectuate
increased compliance with its disclosure provisions, rather than
solely to compensate individuals for their losses.
VII. THE PuRPOSE oF THE 1933 AcT CONFmMs CONGRESS' INrTNT TO
L ir SECTION 11 STANDING
A review of the legislative history of the 1933 Act also makes
clear that Congress intended Section 11 to apply only to securities
purchased in an initial offering.% In response to catastrophic
192. Alan R. Bromberg and Lewis D. Lowenfels, Bromuerg and L(emnfels on
Securities Fraud and Commodities Fraud, § 2.4(440) (2d ed. 1932 & Supp. 1993).
193. Id.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a); see also Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 192, §
2.4(440).
195. Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CoMNELL L REV. 1, 103 (Nov. 1993);
Linda C. Quinn et al., Disclosing Bad News: An Overiewo for Securities Counsel,
1149 PLI/Corp 329,378 (Nov. 1999).
196. The legislative history of the 1934 Act confirms the limited scope of the
civil liabilities of the 1933 AcL See LR. REP. NTO. 73-792. Discussing the civil
liability provisions of the 1934 Act, the House Report notes that "State laws
designed to prevent the exploitation of the investor by supervision of the sale of
securities has [sic] demonstrated the inadequacy of criminal penalties as the
sole sanction." Id. at 12. By enacting the 1934 Act, Congress provided "that any
person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security or who induces
transactions in a security by means of a false or misleading statements, or who
makes a false or misleading statement in the report of a corporation, shall be
liable in damages to those who have bought or sold the security at prices
2001]
196 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
economic events in this country after 1929, Congress began to
create a statutory scheme to regulate the securities industry. As
noted in Gustafson, the relevant Report of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce explicitly states: "[t]he bill
affects only new offerings of securities ... ."197 The restricted
applicability of the bill was noted throughout the House Report,
as Congress reiterated that the bill "does not affect the ordinary
redistribution of securities."198 One of the principal drafters of the
1933 Act noted that the 1933 Act's "patent concern was primarily
with the flow of securities from the issuer through underwriters
to the public rather than with the subsequent buying and selling
of these securities by the public."199
Discussing exemptions, in particular, Congress emphasized
the limited scope of the bill. For example, Congress manifested
an intent to exempt from the coverage of the statute "the
execution by brokers of customer's orders in the open market"200
and "transactions by a dealer in securities not connected by time
or circumstance with distribution of a new offering."201 While
discussing exempted securities and transactions, the House
Committee noted the limited need for exemptions because of
"the restriction of the bill's application to new offerings."2°2
Indeed, Congress recognized that "the bill does not affect
transactions beyond the need of public protection in order to
prevent recurrences of demonstrated abuses"203-presumably a
reference to the floating of worthless new securities in the post-
World War I era.204 These statements are unequivocal evidence of
Congressional intent that the scope of the bill reach only initial
public offerings. In addition, Congress noted that it modeled the
affected by such violation or statement" Id. at 12-13.
197. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,580 (1995) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
73-85, pt II, at 5 (1933)).
198. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. IL at 5.
199. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29,36 (1959).




204. Id. at 2 (discussing the new securities issued during the 1920s).
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1933 Act upon the English Companies Act of 1929.20
Significantly, under the British law, a cause of action extended
only to initial purchasers' 6
Also incorporated into the House Report is the following
letter to Congress from President Roosevelt:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not
take any action which might be construed as approving or
guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties
which they represent will earn profit. There is, however, an
obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities
to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full
publicity and information, and that no essentially important
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the
buying public .... [The Securities Act of 1933] is but one step
in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors.
It should be followed by legislation relating to the better
supervision of the purchase and sale of all property dealt in on
exchanges, and by legislation to correct unethical and unsafe
practices on the part of officers and directors of banks and
other corporations. 07
The House Report explained: "The background of the
President's message is only too familiar to everyone. During the
post-war decade some 50 billion of new securities were floated in
the United States. Fully half or $25,000,000,000 worth of securities
205. Id. at 9. ("The committee is fortified in these [civil liability] sections by
similar safeguards in the English Companies Act of 1929. What is deemed
necessary for sound financing in conservative England ought not be
unnecessary for the more feverish pace which American finance has
developed.")
206. See Robert E. Kohn, Civil Liability for Prinuiaj Securities Distributions in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 55 LAW & CON.IP. PRO. 399, 417 (Fall
1992) (noting that there is no duty of care under the registration provisions of
United Kingdom law to secondary market purchasers); see also Gustafson v.
Alloyd, Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 582 (1995) (noting that the legislative history
"confirm[s] that the civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act §9 11 and 12,
impose obligations on those engaged in 'the business of issuing securities,' in
conformance, not in contradiction to, the British example").
207. I-LR. REP. No. 73-85, pt. I, at 1.
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floated during this period have been proved to be worthless."2 8
The language of the President's letter, made part of the legislative
history, makes unmistakably clear not only that the 1933 Act was
intended to regulate only new public offerings,209 but also that
separate legislation would be needed to regulate subsequent
trading on the exchanges, thereby presaging the 1934 Act, which
governs secondary trading in the post-distribution period.
In enacting the 1933 Act, Congress manifested its desire to
provide the public with "adequate and true information"
regarding newly issued securities.21 0 Accordingly, the House
Report emphasized that chief among the purposes of the
legislation was "an insistence that there should be full disclosure
of every essentially important element attending the issue of a
new security."211 To this end, Congress prescribed the
information that must be divulged to the public in connection
with a new offering of securities.21 2 The waiting period between
the filing of a registration statement and its effective date was
created to allow the public to digest the required information
regarding the new security.21 3  With respect to registration
208. Id. at 2.
209. The one exception to this limited scope is Section 17. See Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,576 (1995).
210. S. REP. No. 73-47, pt. I, at 1. This sentiment is echoed in President
Roosevelt's message. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. 1, at 2.
211. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. , at 3. The other aims of the legislation
included:
(2) A requirement that whatever action taken by the Federal Government for
such disclosure should be limited to that purpose and should be so devised as
not to be capable of being construed as an approval or guarantee of a security
issue. (3) A demand that the persons, whether they be directors, experts, or
underwriters, who sponsor the investment of other people's money should be
held up to the high standards or trusteeship. The achievement of these ends
is the principal purpose of this bill.
Id.
212. Id. at 3-4.
213. Id. (discussing the applicable waiting periods and noting that "an
under-informed public demonstrably hurts the Nation"). Dean Landis, one of
the principal drafters of the 1933 Act, explained that the waiting period "would
give an opportunity for the financial world to acquaint itself with the basic data
underlying a security issue and through that acquaintance to circulate among
the buying public as well as independent dealers some intimation of its
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statements, Congress noted their importance "as a source of
information to the prospective buyer."214  Thus, Congress'
paramount concern was the dissemination and availability of
information attendant to a new issue. 15 In one of its first
opinions addressing the 1933 Act, the Supreme Court confirmed
that "[tIhe essential purpose of the statute is to protect investors
by requiring publication of certain information concerning
securities before offered for sale."216
Congress' regulation of the information disclosed in
connection with the offer of newly issued securities bears a direct
correlation to the establishment of the initial offering price. The
information contained in the registration statement is explicitly
prescribed because:
Liability is imposed upon [issuers] as a condition of the
acquisition of the privilege to do business through the
channels of interstate or foreign commerce. The statements for
which they are responsible, although they may never actually
have been seen by the prospective purchaser, because of their
quality." See Landis, supra note 199, at 35.
214. LKh REP. No. 73-85, pt. II, at 7; see also id. at 9 ("Sections 11 and 12 create
and define civil liabilities imposed by the act.... The committee emphasizes
that these liabilities attach only when there has been an untrue statement of
material fact or omission to state a material fact in the registration statement or
the prospectus-the basic information by which the public is solicited.").
215. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,
124 (1953) ("The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions.").
216. A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 3S, 40 (1941)
(emphasis added). The restriction of the 1933 Act to new issuances of securities
also was noted by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hoclfelder, 425 U.S.
185,194-95 (1976), where the Court explained:
Federal regulation of transactions in securities emerged as part of the
aftermath of the market crash in 1929. The Securities Act of 1933... was
designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information
concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors
against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to
promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing .... The 1934 Act was
intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock
through regulation of transaction upon securities exchanges and in over-the-
counter markets ....
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wide dissemination, determine the market price of the
security, which in the last analysis reflects those manifold
causes that are the impelling motive of the particular
purchase. The connection between the statements made and
the purchase of the security is clear, and, for this reason, it is
the essence of fairness to insist upon the held assumption of
responsibility for the making of these statements.217
The aftermarket purchaser does not share the initial
purchaser's need for information because the secondary market
provides access to superior knowledge regarding the security.
Therefore, the aftermarket purchaser stands in different shoes
than the initial purchaser. This significant distinction
demonstrates that the protections of Section 11-with its
imposition of liability without proof of fraud or reliance-should
not provide a remedy to the aftermarket purchaser.218 In addition
to the registration statement, the aftermarket purchaser acquires
information from the movement of the stock price reflecting the
market's reaction to the security, and also benefits from media
attention and analysts' reports released after the offering. As
time progresses, the aftermarket purchaser also has access to the
issuer's public filings and periodic reports.2 9 As such, the
217. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. II, at 9.
218. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddlestor, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) ("[A]
Section 10(b) plaintiff carries a heavier burden than a Section 11 plaintiff. Most
significantly, he must prove that the defendant acted with scienter, i.e., with
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."). The Section 10(b) plaintiffs
heavier burden counterbalances the "virtually absolute" liability imposed upon
issuers under Section 11. Id.
219. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000) (prescribing the periodic reports and
information that must be filed with the SEC). Pursuant to the authority granted
in the 1934 Act, the SEC has adopted Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13, which require
issuers to file annual and quarterly reports on Forms 10-K and 10-Q. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.13a-1, et seq. (2001) ("Rule 13"). Rule 13a-ll also provides for filing
of current information on Form 8-K. The purpose of the reporting requirements
is to "insure that investors receive adequate periodic reports concerning the
operation and financial condition of the corporations." Securities and Exch.
Comm'n v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Securities and
Exch. Comm'n v. McNulty, Civ. No. 94-7114,1996 WL 422259 (S.D.N.Y. July 29,
1996), affd, 137 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1998). Indeed, the reporting requirements
"were designed to ensure that investors receive adequate information upon
which to base their investment decisions." Securities and Exch. Comm'n v.
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limitation of standing to initial purchasers reflects Congress'
manifest intent
Proponents of extending Section 11 to aftermarket purchasers
focus on a single phrase in the House report to support their
view. In discussing the civil remedies afforded by Section 11, the
Committee noted that those remedies were available "regardless
of whether buyers bought their securities at the time of the
original offer or at some later date .... 2" This statement,
standing alone, does not support a broad extension of Section 11.
First, James Landis, one of the principal drafters of the 1933 Act,
has explained that the House bill's concern was the dissemination
of securities from the issuer through underwriters to the public,
and not subsequent aftermarket trading.2m However, the bill was
"far from perfect on this point"7' Given the abundance of
statements recognizing the limitation of the 1933 Act to initial
distributions of securities, a lone provision that arguably may be
construed otherwise cannot support a broad extension of Section
11. Second, Congress" statement may simply reflect that, in 1933,
the initial distribution may not have been complete for weeks or
months after the securities were first offered to the public. Thus,
securities acquired "at the time of the original offer or at some
later date" may still be part of the initial distribution.w
Similarly, reliance on the Senate report is unavailing to
support an extension of Section 11 to aftermarket purchasersM'
Unlike the House report, the Senate report contains no reference
to the new issue of securities or initial public offerings. The bill
ultimately adopted by Congress was the one sponsored in the
World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 753 (N.D. Ga. 1933).
220. H.R. REP. No. 73-35, pt. III, at 21.
221. Landis, supra note 199, at 36.
222. Id.
223. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, pt. III, at 16 ("Generally speahdng, the average
public offering has been distributed withdn a .... ") (emphasis added); se e
also Pastuszensld, et al., Recent Developments in Standing Under Sections 12(2) and
11 of the 1933 Act: 7e Broad Sweep of Gustafson, SC73 ALI-ABA 665, 674 (199s)
(noting that Congress recognized that in 1933 many public offerings were only
completed over an extended period of time far longer than one day).
224. See S. REP. No. 73-47 (1933).
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House.M In fact, Landis reported that Congress found the Senate
draft unworkable and that "[ilts draftsmanship was of decidedly
inferior quality."=6 Consequently, the Senate report cannot
seriously be considered in determining the scope of the civil
liability provisions of the 1933 Act.
VIII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS COUNSEL IN FAVOR OF LIMITING
STANDING TO INITIAL PURCHASERS
The amorphous and undefined concept of "tracing" creates
enormous practical problems for courts adjudicating securities
claims. Shares sold in a public offering, particularly in an initial
public offering, are often traded many times over in the
secondary market Shares sold in an IPO can be quickly bought
and resold dozens of times over by dozens of different buyers
and sellers in the secondary market. Moreover, shares introduced
through a public offering often supplement a public market for
the securities of that issuer already in active trading. Indeed,
even in initial public offerings, previously outstanding shares
acquired in private offerings or restricted sales find a new public
market for trading. Once the initial offering is completed,
secondary trading of the "new" shares immediately mixes with
trading in the "old" shares. All shares of common stock trade at
the same price and are completely fungible. Because of this
fungibility, the only shares that can be fairly and realistically said
to be "traceable" to an IPO are shares that are actually bought in
the IPO. 2v As one court observed, "in a market transaction, it is
225. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 73-152 (1933) (discussing the adoption of the
House bill); see also Weiss, supra note 68, at 20 ("The Senate did not pull the
laboring oar in the development of the Securities Act. It passed, with relatively
few changes, the bill the Roosevelt Administration had proposed, then largely
assented to the dramatically different bill the House Committee had
developed.").
226. Landis, supra note 199, at 31; see also Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 7, at
33940 (discussing the reaction to the Senate bill and the need "to have drastic
changes made in the bill").
227. Abbey v. Computer Memories, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 870, 874 ((N.D. Cal.
1986).
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difficult to conceive of how [shares] could be traced...."=
The confusion and uncertainty engendered by a broad
interpretation of "tracing" is an anathema to a coherent and
predictable federal securities regulatory scheme.X The need for
predictability and substantive rules that can be applied at the
early stages of litigation are particularly necessary in this area of
the law.230 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged:
[fn the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of
information even a complaint which by objective standards
may have very little chance of success at trial has a settlement
value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of
success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being
resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment The
very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal
business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to
the lawsuit231
228. Warden v. Crown Am. Realty Trust, No. Civ. A. 96-253J, 1993 WL
725946, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Oct 15,1993). Actual share certificates do not trade
today. Most shares in public companies today are incorporated into a book-
entry system, such as the Depository Trust Company ("DTC"). Once the shares
are deposited into DTC, all shares are entirely fungible and there is no way to
"trace" ownership of a particular share back to the IFO without the facts
supporting a "direct trace." See Abbey, 634 F. Supp. at 873. Similarly, shares
held in a brokerage "house account" are completely fungible and cannot be
identified as having been purchased in an offering. Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F.
Supp. 279,286 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
229. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1,12 (1935) (rejecting efforts
to "inject uncertainty" into federal securities regulations); Pinter v. Dahl, 496
U.S. 622, 652-53 (1988) (securities industry "demands certainty and
predictability").
230. Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Securities LitiSation Reform:
The First Year's Experience (Feb. 27, 1997), at http://securities.stanford.edu.
Professors Grundfest and Perino report that "87.6% of the securities class
actions filed from April 1988 through September 1996 ended in a settlement,
with the large majority of the remainder resolved by dispositive motions or
voluntary dismissal. Very few class action securities fraud cases go to trial" Id.
One study found that, out of 952 securities class actions filed between 193S and
1996, only 13 (1.3%) were actually tried. Vincent E. O'Brien, D.B.A., A Study of
Class Action Securities Fraud Cases 1988-1996 (1997), available at
http://wv.lecg.com/study2-htai (last visited).
231. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US. 723,740 (1975).
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The difficulties encountered by issuers facing baseless
securities fraud lawsuits with an unduly expanded class of
plaintiffs harm investors who ultimately suffer the consequences
of an unnecessarily inflated settlement.237 The propensity for
vexatious litigation in this area of the law, without regard to the
merits, strongly favors the imposition of clear rules governing
standing.m
The Supreme Court repeatedly has counseled against unduly
expansive plaintiff classes in securities litigation.2 34 In delineating
the principles of standing governing claims under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, the Blue Chip Stamps Court explained:
Obviously there is no general legal principle that courts in
fashioning substantive law should do so in a manner which
makes it easier, rather than more difficult, for a defendant to
obtain a summary judgment. But in this type of litigation,
where the mere existence of an unresolved lawsuit has
settlement value to the plaintiff not only because of the
possibility that he may prevail on the merits, an entirely
legitimate concept of settlement value, but because of the
threat of extensive discovery and disruption of normal
business activities which may accompany a lawsuit which is
groundless in any event, but cannot be proved so before trial,
such a factor is not to be totally dismissed. The Birnbaum
ruleM undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who have in fact been
232. Id. at 739 ("unduly expansive imposition of civil liability 'will lead to
large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the
benefit of speculators and their lawyers"') (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring)). The Court revisited
this concept in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 n.33 (1976), quoting
then-Chief Judge Cardozo for the proposition that "a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class...
[is] so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of a duty that exposes [business] to these consequences." (quoting
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444 (N.Y. 1931)).
233. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 742-43.
234. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 213 n.33.
235. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff class for the purposes of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was limited to actual purchasers and sellers of
securities. This principle of standing under Section 10(b) became known as the
"Birnbaum rule." See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731 (endorsing the Birnbaum
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damaged by violations of Rule 10b-5, and to that ex:tent it is
undesirable. But it also separates in a readily demonstrable
manner the group of plaintiffs who actually purchased or
actually sold, and whose version of the facts is therefore more
likey to be believed by the trier of fact, from the vastly larger
world of potential plaintiffs who might successfully allege a
claim but could seldom succeed in proving it And this fact is
one of its advantages.Z6
This same reasoning applies to Section 11 and compels its
limitation to initial purchasers. Allowing a claim to stand on the
mere allegation of "traceability" without ascribing a substantive
meaning to the term contravenes the rationale underlying the
Blue Chip Stamps decision. In rejecting an expansive reading of
Section 11, the Banes court indicated that it would be an abuse of
judicial discretion "to allow recovery by persons not legally
entitled thereto."237 Conversely, there is no abuse of discretion
when courts "limit[ participation to those who might have
recovered had the suits been fought and won."2 3
These same considerations prompted the enactment of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) which provides a vehicle for
a party to obtain an interlocutory appellate review of a class
certification decision.23 9  The enactment of Rule 23(f) has
particular import in the field of securities litigation where class
actions predominate.2 0 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in Blair v. Equifax,211 first addressed
circumstances meriting interlocutory review. Among the factors
that courts should consider in determining the propriety of
interlocutory review is that a grant of class status can exert
rule).
236. Blue Chip Stamps. 421 U.S at 742-43..
237. Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269,271 (2d Cir. 1967).
23. Id.
239. See Advisory Committee Notes, Fed. R Civ. P. 23(f) ("An order granting
certification... may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.").
240. See Tamara Loomis, Securities Fraud: Lawyers SeI: R'view of a Key Class
Action Rulin& N.Y. L.J. (OctL 26, 2000) (reporting an increase in securities class
action filings between 1995 and 1999); Ece also Securities Fraud Litigation Sets
Record in 1998, supra note 18.
241. 181 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1999).
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pressures on defendants to settle even where the plaintiffs'
probability of success on the merits is remote.242 Referring
specifically to securities class actions, the Seventh Circuit
observed that the "interaction of procedure with the merits
justifies an earlier appellate look."243 This acknowledgment of
settlement pressures peculiar to the area of securities litigation
illustrates the need for clarity and workable standards on
threshold questions such as standing.
CONCLUSION
Eradication of the "tracing" concept from Section 11
jurisprudence would reflect the proper interpretation of the
statutory language and legislative intent, and provide clarity in
this important area of the law. Courts must clearly and
concretely define who has standing under Section 11.
The language of the statute, legislative history, persuasive
caselaw, and market realities demonstrate that one rule makes
sense: only purchasers in the actual initial distribution of
securities itself have standing to maintain a claim under Section
11. Such a rule would further congressional intent as reflected in
the 1933 Act and resolve the current discordance between
Sections 11 and 12. Moreover, because Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 provide the aftermarket purchaser with an appropriate
cause of action that would adequately compensate them for their
losses, plaintiffs would not be deprived of a remedy for securities
fraud. The issue of standing can be addressed through
allegations regarding when, from whom, and the price at which a
security was purchased. The logic and ease of application of this
approach would not only facilitate the development of the law in
this area, but would provide parties with clear rules by which
they could structure and manage complicated transactions.
242. Id. at 834.
243. Id.
